Wiashing you well.Hope Contracts wasn't bad! Torts will be heck, but remember your training. I will be in tomorrow and Tuesday. Will ty to hold a review hour Tuesday.
ER
P.S. Please post questions as comments here!!
Sunday, December 5, 2010
Wednesday, November 3, 2010
A Hypo?
Briefly, a student, 20, died when high speed winds knocked over the lift on which he was standing, filming the football practice for the team. Coach Kelly had received evidence of the dangerous winds via a weather service, yet felt it was okay to hold practice outside as opposed to the team's in-door practice complex. Kelly is admitting fault, so I am sure there will be some kind of settlement. Article is below.
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/football/ncaa/10/30/notredame.sullivan.ap/index.html?eref=sihp
http://sportsillustrated.cnn.com/2010/football/ncaa/10/30/notredame.sullivan.ap/index.html?eref=sihp
Wednesday, September 15, 2010
Gulf Refining...
185 So. 234 FOR EDUCATIONAL USE ONLY
183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234
(Cite as: 183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234)
C
Supreme Court of Mississippi, Division A.
GULF REFINING CO. et al.
v.
WILLIAMS.
No. 33422.
Dec. 12, 1938.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Hinds County; J. P. Alexander, Judge.
Action by Willie Williams against the Gulf Refining Company and others for
injuries allegedly resulting from defect in gasoline container which caused a
fire. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Negligence 272 k 213
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k213 k. Foreseeability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 272k10)
An actor will be liable for all such harm as a reasonably prudent person would or
should have anticipated as the natural and probable consequences of his act; and
the act must be of such character and done in such a situation that the actor
should reasonably have anticipated that some injury to another would probably
result.
[2] Evidence 157 k 584(1)
157 Evidence
157XIV Weight and Sufficiency
157k584 Weight and Conclusiveness in General
157k584(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Negligence 272 k 213
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k213 k. Foreseeability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 272k10)
"Probability" in the law of negligence, as respects actor's liability for
foreseeable results of his act, arises when viewed from the standpoint of the
judgment of a reasonably prudent man, as a reasonable thing to be expected, while
probability exists in the procedural law only when the proof is such that the
alleged fact probably happened or existed in the past, in the sense of
"probability" as commonly understood.
[3] Evidence 157 k 596(1)
157 Evidence
157XIV Weight and Sufficiency
157k596 Degree of Proof in General
157k596(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Where inquiry is whether a certain alleged fact existed or happened in the past,
it is not sufficient to prove a mere possibility, however substantial, but the
fact must be established as a "probability," using the word in its ordinary and
common acceptation.
[4] Negligence 272 k 213
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k213 k. Foreseeability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 272k10)
Where the inquiry is upon foreseeability of a thing that may happen in the future,
to the anticipation of which the law of negligence holds a party as a measure of
duty, inquiry is not whether the thing is to be foreseeable or anticipated as one
which will "probably" happen, according to the ordinary acceptation of the term,
but whether it is likely to happen, even though the likelihood may not amount to a
comparative probability.
[5] Negligence 272 k 213
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k213 k. Foreseeability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 272k10)
Remote possibilities are not within the rules of negligence as respects
foreseeability, and such rules do not demand that a person should prevision or
anticipate an unusual, improbable or extraordinary occurrence.
[6] Negligence 272 k 213
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k213 k. Foreseeability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 272k10)
The test of foreseeability of injury, as affecting actor's liability, is not the
balance of probabilites that damage will result, but the existence of some real
likelihood of damage, of such appreciable weight and moment as would induce action
to avoid it on the part of a reasonably prudent person.
[7] Explosives 164 k 9
164 Explosives
164k6 Injuries from Accidental Explosions
164k9 k. Illegal or Negligent Sale. Most Cited Cases
The vendor of an inherently dangerous commodity, such as gasoline, must use
cautious care to distribute it in reasonably safe containers, to a degree
commensurate with the danger, and his obligation is not dependent upon contractual
relations, but extends to all who may lawfully use or be in the vicinity of the
container.
[8] Explosives 164 k 9
164 Explosives
164k6 Injuries from Accidental Explosions
164k9 k. Illegal or Negligent Sale. Most Cited Cases
Where defect in threads of bung cap on gasoline drum, known to employees of seller
of gasoline, caused outburst of fire when buyer's employee tried to remove the
cap, seller should have foreseen probability of the accident, and hence was liable
for injuries to buyer's employee.
*235 Green, Green & Jackson, of Jackson, for appellants.
Barnett, Jones & Barnett, of Jackson, for appellee.
GRIFFITH, Justice.
Appellants are the distributors of petroleum products, including gasoline.
Shortly before the injury here complained of, appellants, from their station at
Canton, sold and delivered to a planter in that vicinity a drum of gasoline for
use in farm tractors. Appellee was the planter's employe and was engaged in
operating a tractor. The drum of gasoline had been taken to the field, but no
attempt had been made to use it, until, for the first time since its delivery,
appellee undertook to remove the bung-hole cap from the drum in order to replenish
the fuel in the tractor, whereupon there was a sudden outburst of fire, caused, as
the jury was justified in concluding upon the evidence, by a spark which was
produced by the condition of unrepair in the threads of the bung cap, as will be
later mentioned.
Appellee was severely burned by the sudden fire, and recovered judgment in an
action therefor, from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
The chief argument of appellants is that the proof shows that an explosion or fire
in drawing gasoline from a drum when, or on account of, taking off the bung cap is
an unusual, extraordinary, and improbable occurrence, so much so that some of the
witnesses say that no such happening had ever before been heard of by them; and
that, therefore, appellant cannot be held liable as for a failure to anticipate
the danger of any such improbable occurrence. And appellants call attention to
language used by the courts wherein the declaration is made that there is no
liability when the occurrence is unusual, extraordinary, and improbable. Such
terms are used in some of our decisions, one of which we will later cite. This
language refers, however, to remote possibilities,-to occurrences outside of what
is to be reasonably anticipated in the very nature of the harm-producing agency,
or harm-producing situation, which is being considered. The argument that there
is no negligence because an injury rarely occurs, or never before occurred, in a
given situation was expressly rejected in Crawford v. City of Meridian, 174 Miss.
875, 879, 165 So. 612.
All the above might be disposed of by the observation that it is not shown that
ever before was any gasoline sent out by a distributor in a drum or container in
the condition of unrepair which the evidence discloses in this case; but the
argument before us merits consideration beyond that available disposition.
[1] The general language of the courts in stating the rule of the law of
negligence in regard to the liability of the actor as to harmful results which are
foreseeable is that he will be liable for all such harm as a reasonably prudent
person would or should have anticipated as the natural and probable consequences
of his act. Or that, in order that a person doing a particular act which results
in injury to another shall be liable therefor, the act must be of such character
and done in such a situation that the person doing it should reasonably have
anticipated that some injury to another will probably result therefrom.
[2] This general language has lead to the occasional misunderstanding as to what
may be termed the degree of probability which is meant by these expressions, as
used in the law of negligence; and it is sometimes supposed and argued that unless
such a foreseeable consequence is one which is more likely to happen than not to
happen there can be no liability. But these references to probability are in a
different sense as compared with what is meant in the procedural law when there is
under inquiry whether a certain event happened, or probably happened, in the past.
"Probability arises in the law of negligence when viewed from the standpoint of
the judgment of a reasonably prudent man, as a reasonable thing to be expected,"
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Bloodworth, 166 Miss. 602, 617, 145 So. 333, 336,-that is
to *236 say, in the future; while probability exists in the procedural law only
when the proof is such that the alleged fact probably happened or existed in the
past, in the sense of probability as commonly understood under every day language.
[3][4] When the inquiry is upon an issue whether a certain alleged fact existed
or happened in the past, it is not sufficient to prove only or no more than a
possibility, however substantial the possibility may be, so long as it is only a
possibility. There the proof must establish the fact as a probability, using that
word in its ordinary and common acceptation. This has so often been declared by
this Court and all other courts that the citation of authority upon it is no
longer necessary. But when the inquiry is one of forseeability, is as regards a
thing that may happen in the future, and to which the law of negligence holds a
party to anticipation as a measure of duty, that inquiry is not whether the thing
is to be foreseen or anticipated as one which will probably happen, according to
the ordinary acceptation of that term, but whether it is likely to happen, even
though the likelihood may not be sufficient to amount to a comparative
probability.
[5][6] It is true, as already mentioned, that remote possibilities are not within
the rules of negligence as respects foreseeability. As said in Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Bloodworth, supra, these rules do not demand "that a person should
prevision or anticipate an unusual, improbable, or extraordinary occurrence,
though such happening is within the range of possibilities. *** Remote
possibilities do not constitute negligence from the judicial standpoint." On the
other hand, in order to bring the rule of liability into operation, it is not
necessary that the chances that a damage will result shall be greater than the
chances that no damage will occur. The test as respects foreseeability is not the
balance of probabilities, but the existence, in the situation in hand, of some
real likelihood of some damage and the likelihood is of such appreciable weight
and moment as to induce, or which reasonably should induce, action to avoid it on
the part of a person of a reasonably prudent mind. Tullgren v. Amoskeag Mfg.
Co., 82 N. H. 268, 133 A. 4, 46 A. L. R. 380, and the numerous cases cited; 45 C.
J. pp. 657, 658. See, also, Sec. 289, A. L. I. Restatement Torts, Vol. 2,
Negligence, and City of Greenville v. Laury, 172 Miss. 118, 159 So. 121.
[7] The vendor of an inherently dangerous commodity, such as gasoline, is under
duty to use cautious care to distribute the same in reasonably safe containers,
the degree of care thereinabout to be commensurate with the danger, and the
obligation of this duty is not dependent upon contractual relations, but extends
to all who may lawfully use, or be in the vicinity of, the container, 11 R.C.L.
pp. 701, 702; 45 C.J. 845, 847, 849. There is a sufficient number of cases cited
in the notes to Hopper v. Cooper & Co., 104 N.J.L. 93, 139 A. 19, 55 A.L.R. 187,
194, to fully disclose the rule as stated on this point, when those cases are
carefully examined.
[8] The drum, or gasoline container, involved herein was of standard material,
construction and manufacture, and of the kind in general use; and had it been in
reasonably good repair there would, of course, be no liability. But the proof is
that the drum had been in use nine years; that the threads in the bung plug or
bung cap were broken, bent and jagged; that this condition had been brought about
by repeated hammering on the bung cap during the course of its use,-a condition
which had attracted the attention of one of appellants' employes before the
container was sent out on this occasion. There is no adequate proof to show that
appellee had equal knowledge or appreciation of the significance of this fact, or
any knowledge which was sufficient to put the use at his risk as by the so-called
assumption thereof, as contended for by appellants,-leaving aside whether, if the
facts were otherwise, there would be assumption of risk, rather than contributory
negligence. Compare Standard Oil Company v. Evans, 154 Miss. 475, 122 So. 735.
The proof is sufficient to show that a person of ordinary prudence, and mindful of
the duty of cautious care with which appellants were charged, should have known of
the condition aforesaid and should reasonably have anticipated, as a likelihood of
weight and moment, that a sudden fire or explosion would be caused by the stated
condition of unrepair; and hence appellants are liable for the injury to appellee
which resulted.
The other assignments have been considered, and we do not find in them sufficient
to require a reversal.
Affirmed.
Miss. 1938.
Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams
183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234
END OF DOCUMENT
Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for LANDAU,REBECCA
Date/Time of Request: Monday, September 13, 2010 14:46 Central
Client Identifier: REBECCA LANDAU
Database: MS-CS
Citation Text: 185 So. 234
Lines: 214
Documents: 1
Images: 0
Recipient(s): beccalandau@gmail.com
The material accompanying this summary is subject to copyright. Usage is governed by contract with Thomson Reuters, West and their affiliates.
183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234
(Cite as: 183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234)
C
Supreme Court of Mississippi, Division A.
GULF REFINING CO. et al.
v.
WILLIAMS.
No. 33422.
Dec. 12, 1938.
Appeal from Circuit Court, Hinds County; J. P. Alexander, Judge.
Action by Willie Williams against the Gulf Refining Company and others for
injuries allegedly resulting from defect in gasoline container which caused a
fire. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendants appeal.
Affirmed.
West Headnotes
[1] Negligence 272 k 213
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k213 k. Foreseeability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 272k10)
An actor will be liable for all such harm as a reasonably prudent person would or
should have anticipated as the natural and probable consequences of his act; and
the act must be of such character and done in such a situation that the actor
should reasonably have anticipated that some injury to another would probably
result.
[2] Evidence 157 k 584(1)
157 Evidence
157XIV Weight and Sufficiency
157k584 Weight and Conclusiveness in General
157k584(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Negligence 272 k 213
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k213 k. Foreseeability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 272k10)
"Probability" in the law of negligence, as respects actor's liability for
foreseeable results of his act, arises when viewed from the standpoint of the
judgment of a reasonably prudent man, as a reasonable thing to be expected, while
probability exists in the procedural law only when the proof is such that the
alleged fact probably happened or existed in the past, in the sense of
"probability" as commonly understood.
[3] Evidence 157 k 596(1)
157 Evidence
157XIV Weight and Sufficiency
157k596 Degree of Proof in General
157k596(1) k. In General. Most Cited Cases
Where inquiry is whether a certain alleged fact existed or happened in the past,
it is not sufficient to prove a mere possibility, however substantial, but the
fact must be established as a "probability," using the word in its ordinary and
common acceptation.
[4] Negligence 272 k 213
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k213 k. Foreseeability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 272k10)
Where the inquiry is upon foreseeability of a thing that may happen in the future,
to the anticipation of which the law of negligence holds a party as a measure of
duty, inquiry is not whether the thing is to be foreseeable or anticipated as one
which will "probably" happen, according to the ordinary acceptation of the term,
but whether it is likely to happen, even though the likelihood may not amount to a
comparative probability.
[5] Negligence 272 k 213
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k213 k. Foreseeability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 272k10)
Remote possibilities are not within the rules of negligence as respects
foreseeability, and such rules do not demand that a person should prevision or
anticipate an unusual, improbable or extraordinary occurrence.
[6] Negligence 272 k 213
272 Negligence
272II Necessity and Existence of Duty
272k213 k. Foreseeability. Most Cited Cases
(Formerly 272k10)
The test of foreseeability of injury, as affecting actor's liability, is not the
balance of probabilites that damage will result, but the existence of some real
likelihood of damage, of such appreciable weight and moment as would induce action
to avoid it on the part of a reasonably prudent person.
[7] Explosives 164 k 9
164 Explosives
164k6 Injuries from Accidental Explosions
164k9 k. Illegal or Negligent Sale. Most Cited Cases
The vendor of an inherently dangerous commodity, such as gasoline, must use
cautious care to distribute it in reasonably safe containers, to a degree
commensurate with the danger, and his obligation is not dependent upon contractual
relations, but extends to all who may lawfully use or be in the vicinity of the
container.
[8] Explosives 164 k 9
164 Explosives
164k6 Injuries from Accidental Explosions
164k9 k. Illegal or Negligent Sale. Most Cited Cases
Where defect in threads of bung cap on gasoline drum, known to employees of seller
of gasoline, caused outburst of fire when buyer's employee tried to remove the
cap, seller should have foreseen probability of the accident, and hence was liable
for injuries to buyer's employee.
*235 Green, Green & Jackson, of Jackson, for appellants.
Barnett, Jones & Barnett, of Jackson, for appellee.
GRIFFITH, Justice.
Appellants are the distributors of petroleum products, including gasoline.
Shortly before the injury here complained of, appellants, from their station at
Canton, sold and delivered to a planter in that vicinity a drum of gasoline for
use in farm tractors. Appellee was the planter's employe and was engaged in
operating a tractor. The drum of gasoline had been taken to the field, but no
attempt had been made to use it, until, for the first time since its delivery,
appellee undertook to remove the bung-hole cap from the drum in order to replenish
the fuel in the tractor, whereupon there was a sudden outburst of fire, caused, as
the jury was justified in concluding upon the evidence, by a spark which was
produced by the condition of unrepair in the threads of the bung cap, as will be
later mentioned.
Appellee was severely burned by the sudden fire, and recovered judgment in an
action therefor, from which judgment this appeal is prosecuted.
The chief argument of appellants is that the proof shows that an explosion or fire
in drawing gasoline from a drum when, or on account of, taking off the bung cap is
an unusual, extraordinary, and improbable occurrence, so much so that some of the
witnesses say that no such happening had ever before been heard of by them; and
that, therefore, appellant cannot be held liable as for a failure to anticipate
the danger of any such improbable occurrence. And appellants call attention to
language used by the courts wherein the declaration is made that there is no
liability when the occurrence is unusual, extraordinary, and improbable. Such
terms are used in some of our decisions, one of which we will later cite. This
language refers, however, to remote possibilities,-to occurrences outside of what
is to be reasonably anticipated in the very nature of the harm-producing agency,
or harm-producing situation, which is being considered. The argument that there
is no negligence because an injury rarely occurs, or never before occurred, in a
given situation was expressly rejected in Crawford v. City of Meridian, 174 Miss.
875, 879, 165 So. 612.
All the above might be disposed of by the observation that it is not shown that
ever before was any gasoline sent out by a distributor in a drum or container in
the condition of unrepair which the evidence discloses in this case; but the
argument before us merits consideration beyond that available disposition.
[1] The general language of the courts in stating the rule of the law of
negligence in regard to the liability of the actor as to harmful results which are
foreseeable is that he will be liable for all such harm as a reasonably prudent
person would or should have anticipated as the natural and probable consequences
of his act. Or that, in order that a person doing a particular act which results
in injury to another shall be liable therefor, the act must be of such character
and done in such a situation that the person doing it should reasonably have
anticipated that some injury to another will probably result therefrom.
[2] This general language has lead to the occasional misunderstanding as to what
may be termed the degree of probability which is meant by these expressions, as
used in the law of negligence; and it is sometimes supposed and argued that unless
such a foreseeable consequence is one which is more likely to happen than not to
happen there can be no liability. But these references to probability are in a
different sense as compared with what is meant in the procedural law when there is
under inquiry whether a certain event happened, or probably happened, in the past.
"Probability arises in the law of negligence when viewed from the standpoint of
the judgment of a reasonably prudent man, as a reasonable thing to be expected,"
Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Bloodworth, 166 Miss. 602, 617, 145 So. 333, 336,-that is
to *236 say, in the future; while probability exists in the procedural law only
when the proof is such that the alleged fact probably happened or existed in the
past, in the sense of probability as commonly understood under every day language.
[3][4] When the inquiry is upon an issue whether a certain alleged fact existed
or happened in the past, it is not sufficient to prove only or no more than a
possibility, however substantial the possibility may be, so long as it is only a
possibility. There the proof must establish the fact as a probability, using that
word in its ordinary and common acceptation. This has so often been declared by
this Court and all other courts that the citation of authority upon it is no
longer necessary. But when the inquiry is one of forseeability, is as regards a
thing that may happen in the future, and to which the law of negligence holds a
party to anticipation as a measure of duty, that inquiry is not whether the thing
is to be foreseen or anticipated as one which will probably happen, according to
the ordinary acceptation of that term, but whether it is likely to happen, even
though the likelihood may not be sufficient to amount to a comparative
probability.
[5][6] It is true, as already mentioned, that remote possibilities are not within
the rules of negligence as respects foreseeability. As said in Illinois Central
Railroad Co. v. Bloodworth, supra, these rules do not demand "that a person should
prevision or anticipate an unusual, improbable, or extraordinary occurrence,
though such happening is within the range of possibilities. *** Remote
possibilities do not constitute negligence from the judicial standpoint." On the
other hand, in order to bring the rule of liability into operation, it is not
necessary that the chances that a damage will result shall be greater than the
chances that no damage will occur. The test as respects foreseeability is not the
balance of probabilities, but the existence, in the situation in hand, of some
real likelihood of some damage and the likelihood is of such appreciable weight
and moment as to induce, or which reasonably should induce, action to avoid it on
the part of a person of a reasonably prudent mind. Tullgren v. Amoskeag Mfg.
Co., 82 N. H. 268, 133 A. 4, 46 A. L. R. 380, and the numerous cases cited; 45 C.
J. pp. 657, 658. See, also, Sec. 289, A. L. I. Restatement Torts, Vol. 2,
Negligence, and City of Greenville v. Laury, 172 Miss. 118, 159 So. 121.
[7] The vendor of an inherently dangerous commodity, such as gasoline, is under
duty to use cautious care to distribute the same in reasonably safe containers,
the degree of care thereinabout to be commensurate with the danger, and the
obligation of this duty is not dependent upon contractual relations, but extends
to all who may lawfully use, or be in the vicinity of, the container, 11 R.C.L.
pp. 701, 702; 45 C.J. 845, 847, 849. There is a sufficient number of cases cited
in the notes to Hopper v. Cooper & Co., 104 N.J.L. 93, 139 A. 19, 55 A.L.R. 187,
194, to fully disclose the rule as stated on this point, when those cases are
carefully examined.
[8] The drum, or gasoline container, involved herein was of standard material,
construction and manufacture, and of the kind in general use; and had it been in
reasonably good repair there would, of course, be no liability. But the proof is
that the drum had been in use nine years; that the threads in the bung plug or
bung cap were broken, bent and jagged; that this condition had been brought about
by repeated hammering on the bung cap during the course of its use,-a condition
which had attracted the attention of one of appellants' employes before the
container was sent out on this occasion. There is no adequate proof to show that
appellee had equal knowledge or appreciation of the significance of this fact, or
any knowledge which was sufficient to put the use at his risk as by the so-called
assumption thereof, as contended for by appellants,-leaving aside whether, if the
facts were otherwise, there would be assumption of risk, rather than contributory
negligence. Compare Standard Oil Company v. Evans, 154 Miss. 475, 122 So. 735.
The proof is sufficient to show that a person of ordinary prudence, and mindful of
the duty of cautious care with which appellants were charged, should have known of
the condition aforesaid and should reasonably have anticipated, as a likelihood of
weight and moment, that a sudden fire or explosion would be caused by the stated
condition of unrepair; and hence appellants are liable for the injury to appellee
which resulted.
The other assignments have been considered, and we do not find in them sufficient
to require a reversal.
Affirmed.
Miss. 1938.
Gulf Refining Co. v. Williams
183 Miss. 723, 185 So. 234
END OF DOCUMENT
Westlaw Delivery Summary Report for LANDAU,REBECCA
Date/Time of Request: Monday, September 13, 2010 14:46 Central
Client Identifier: REBECCA LANDAU
Database: MS-CS
Citation Text: 185 So. 234
Lines: 214
Documents: 1
Images: 0
Recipient(s): beccalandau@gmail.com
The material accompanying this summary is subject to copyright. Usage is governed by contract with Thomson Reuters, West and their affiliates.
Tuesday, August 17, 2010
A word of Inspiration....
Perseverance
What would you run for?
Your country should be there
But that cant be all
You must go and think,
For thinking is living
But don't solely think,
You must also dream
For where would you be without hope
That one powerful force
that keeps you going on and on
You must learn the ways
To dream and think
Only then will living be achieved
Only then will you be complete
Sure, you can be alive without it
But you wont acutely live
Without dreams you are nothing
Try your hardest
and you shall prevail
Never simply walk to your goal
Run at full speed
For if you run fast
You can knock down any barricade
When you think you are there
You simply must find out
Just ask to yourself
Was it worth it?
Would I die for this job?
If you so much as think no
Then keep on going
But even if you say yes
You must never stop
Strive other paths,
Try to fix what we have left in the world
For with that you can never quit
For the people destroying it don't quit
So why should you?
Instead you should work double
Always try,
Always succeed.
Light the darkness with light.
By Dillon Crawford
What would you run for?
Your country should be there
But that cant be all
You must go and think,
For thinking is living
But don't solely think,
You must also dream
For where would you be without hope
That one powerful force
that keeps you going on and on
You must learn the ways
To dream and think
Only then will living be achieved
Only then will you be complete
Sure, you can be alive without it
But you wont acutely live
Without dreams you are nothing
Try your hardest
and you shall prevail
Never simply walk to your goal
Run at full speed
For if you run fast
You can knock down any barricade
When you think you are there
You simply must find out
Just ask to yourself
Was it worth it?
Would I die for this job?
If you so much as think no
Then keep on going
But even if you say yes
You must never stop
Strive other paths,
Try to fix what we have left in the world
For with that you can never quit
For the people destroying it don't quit
So why should you?
Instead you should work double
Always try,
Always succeed.
Light the darkness with light.
By Dillon Crawford
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